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Abstract
We present simple differentially private estimators for the mean and covariance of mul-
tivariate sub-Gaussian data that are accurate at small sample sizes. We demonstrate the
effectiveness of our algorithms both theoretically and empirically using synthetic and real-world
datasets—showing that their asymptotic error rates match the state-of-the-art theoretical
bounds, and that they concretely outperform all previous methods. Specifically, previous
estimators either have weak empirical accuracy at small sample sizes, perform poorly for
multivariate data, or require the user to provide strong a priori estimates for the parameters.
1 Introduction
One of the most basic problems in statistics and machine learning is to estimate the mean and
covariance of a distribution based on i.i.d. samples. Not only are these some of the most basic
summary statistics one could want for a real-valued distribution, but they are also building
blocks for more sophisticated statistical estimation tasks like linear regression and stochastic
convex optimization.
The optimal solutions to these problems are folklore—simply output the empirical mean and
covariance of the samples. However, this solution is not suitable when the samples consist of
sensitive, private information belonging to individuals, as it has been shown repeatedly that even
releasing just the empirical mean can reveal this sensitive information [DN03, HSR+08, BUV14,
DSS+15, DSSU17]. Thus, we need estimators that are not only accurate with respect to the
underlying distribution, but also protect the privacy of the individuals represented in the sample.
The most widely accepted solution to individual privacy in statistics and machine learning
is differential privacy (DP) [DMNS06], which provides a strong guarantee of individual privacy
by ensuring that no individual has a significant influence on the learned parameters. A large
body of work now shows that, in principle, nearly every statistical task can be solved privately,
and differential privacy is now being deployed by Apple [Dif17], Google [EPK14, BEM+17],
Microsoft [DKY17], and the US Census Bureau [DLS+17].
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Figure 1: The cost of privacy, measured as the ratio of our iterative estimator’s error to that of
the non-private estimator. For mean estimation (left) we use d = 50 and privacy level ρ = 0.5
and vary n ∈ (300, 5000). For covariance estimation (right) we use d = 10 privacy level ρ = 0.5
and vary n ∈ (2000, 10000).
Differential privacy requires adding random noise to some stage of the estimation procedure,
and this noise might increase the error of the final estimate. Typically, the amount of noise
vanishes as the sample size n grows, and one can often show that as n → ∞, the additional
error due to privacy vanishes faster than the sampling error of the estimator, making differential
privacy highly practical for large samples.
However, differential privacy is often difficult to achieve for small datasets, or when the
dataset is large, but we want to restrict attention to some small subpopulation within the data.
Thus, a recent trend has been to focus on simple, widely used estimation tasks, and design
estimators with good concrete performance at small samples sizes. Most relevant to our work,
Karwa and Vadhan [KV18] and Du, Foot, Moniot, Bray, and Groce [DFM+20] give practical
mean and variance estimators for univariate Gaussian data. However, as we show, these methods
do not scale well to the more challenging multivariate setting.
1.1 Contributions
In this work we give simple, practical estimators for the mean and covariance of multivariate
sub-Gaussian data. We call our method CoinPress, for COnfidence-INterval-based PRivate
EStimation Strategy. We validate our estimators theoretically and empirically. On the theoretical
side, we show that our estimators match the state-of-the-art asymptotic bounds for sub-Gaussian
mean and covariance estimation [KLSU19]. On the empirical side, we give an extensive evaluation
with synthetic data, as well as a demonstration on a real-world dataset. We show that our
estimators have error comparable to that of the non-private empirical mean and covariance at
small sample sizes. See Figure 1 for one representative example of our algorithm’s performance.
Our mean estimator also improves over the state-of-the-art method of Du et al. [DFM+20], which
was developed for univariate data but can be applied coordinate-wise to estimate multivariate
data. We highlight a few other important features of our methods:
First, like many differentially private estimators, our method requires the user to input some
a priori knowledge of the data. For mean estimation, we require the mean lives in a specified
ball of radius R, and for covariance estimation we require that the covariance matrix can be
sandwiched spectrally between A and KA for some matrix A. Some a priori boundedness is
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necessary for algorithms like ours that satisfy concentrated DP [DR16, BS16, Mir17, BDRS18],
or satisfy pure DP.1 We show that our estimator is practical when these parameters are taken to
be extremely large, meaning the user only needs a very weak prior.
Second, for simplicity, we describe and evaluate our methods primarily with Gaussian data.
However, the only feature of Gaussian data that is relevant for our methods is a strong bound
on the tails of the distribution, and, by definition, these bounds hold for any sub-Gaussian
distribution. Moreover, using experiments with both heavier-tailed synthetic data and with
real-world data, we demonstrate that our method remains useful even when the data is not truly
Gaussian. Note that some restriction on the details of the data is necessary, at least in the
worst-case, as [KSU20] showed that the minimax optimal error is highly sensitive to the rate of
decay of the distribution’s tails.
Figure 2: Visualizing a run of the mean
estimator with n = 160, ρ = 0.1, t = 3.
The data is represented by the blue
dots, the black circles represent the it-
eratively shrinking confidence ball, and
the orange dot is the final private mean
estimate.
Approach. At a high-level, our estimators work by
iteratively refining an estimate for the parameters, in-
spired by [KLSU19]. For mean estimation, we start with
some (potentially very large) ball B1 of radius R1 that
we know contains most of the mass of the probability
distribution. We then use this ball to run a na¨ıve esti-
mation procedure: clip the data to the ball B1, then add
noise to the empirical mean of the clipped data to obtain
some initial estimate of the mean. Specifically, the noise
will have magnitude proportional to R1/n. Using this
estimate, and knowledge of how we obtainesd it, we can
draw a (hopefully significantly smaller) ball B2 of radius
R2 that contains most of the mass and then repeat. Af-
ter a few iterations, we will have some ball Bt of radius
Rt that tightly contains most of the datapoints, and use
this to make an accurate final private estimate of the
meanwith noise proportional to Rt/n. Our covariance
estimation uses the same iterative approach, although
the geometry is significantly more subtle.
1.2 Problem Formulation
We now give a more detailed description of the problem we consider in this work. We are given
an ordered set of samples X = (X1, . . . , Xn) ⊆ Rd where each Xi represents some individual’s
sensitive data. We would like an estimator M(X) that is private for the individuals in the sample,
and also accurate in that when X consists of i.i.d. samples from some distribution P , then
M(X) estimates the mean and covariance of P with small error. Notice that privacy will be a
worst-case property, making no distributional assumptions, whereas accuracy will be formulated
as an average-case property relying on distributional assumptions.
For privacy, we require that M is insensitive to any one sample in X in the following sense:
We say that two samples X,X ′ ⊆ Rd of size n are neighboring if they differ on at most one
1Under pure or concentrated DP, the dependence on R and K must be polylogarithmic [KV18, BKSW19]. One
can allow R = ∞ for mean estimation under (ε, δ)-DP with δ > 0 [KV18], although the resulting algorithm has
poor concrete performance even for univariate data. It is an open question whether one can allow K = ∞ for
covariance estimation even under (ε, δ)-DP.
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sample.2 Informally, we say that a randomized algorithm M is differentially private [DMNS06]
if the distributions M(X) and M(X ′) are similar for every pair of neighboring datasets X,X ′.
In this work, we adopt the quantiative formulation of differential privacy called concentrated
differential privacy (zCDP) [DR16, BS16].
Definition 1.1 (zCDP). An estimator M(X) satisfies ρ-zCDP if for every pair of neighboring
samples X,X ′ of size n, and every α ∈ (1,∞), Dα(M(X)‖M(X ′)) ≤ ρα, where Dα is the Re´nyi
divergence of order α.
This formulation sits in between general (ε, δ)-differential privacy and the special case of
(ε, 0)-differential privacy,3 and better captures the privacy cost of private algorithms in high
dimension [DSSU17].
To formulate the accuracy of our mechanism, we posit that X is sampled i.i.d. from some
distribution P , and our goal is to estimate the mean µ ∈ Rd and covariance Σ ∈ Rd×d with
µ = E
x∼P
[x] and Σ = E
x∼P
[
(x− µ)T (x− µ)].
We assume that our algorithms are given some a priori estimate of the mean in the form of a
radius R such that ‖µ‖2 ≤ R and some a priori estimate of the covariance in the form of K such
that I  Σ  KI, (equivalently all the singular values of Σ lie between 1 and K). We repeat that
some a priori bound on R,K is necessary for any algorithm that satisfies zCDP [BS16, KV18].
We measure the error in Mahalanobis distance ‖ · ‖Σ, which reports how the error com-
pares to the covariance of the distribution, and has the benefit of being invariant under affine
transformations. Specifically,
‖µˆ− µ‖Σ = ‖Σ−1/2(µˆ− µ)‖2 and ‖Σˆ− Σ‖Σ = ‖Σ−1/2ΣˆΣ−1/2 − I‖F .
For any distribution, the empirical mean µˆ and empirical covariance Σˆ satisfy
E[‖µˆ− µ‖Σ] ≤
√
d
n
and E
[
‖Σˆ− Σ‖Σ
]
≤
√
d2
n
,
and these estimators are minimax optimal. Our goal is to obtain estimators that have similar
accuracy to the empirical mean and covariance. We note that the folklore na¨ıve estimators (see
e.g. [KV18, KLSU19]) for mean and covariance based on clipping the data to an appropriate ball
and adding carefully calibrated noise to the empirical mean and covariance would guarantee
E[‖µˆ− µ‖Σ] ≤
√
d
n
+
R2d2
n2ρ
and E
[
‖Σˆ− Σ‖Σ
]
≤
√
d2
n
+
K2d4
n2ρ
.
The main downside of the na¨ıve estimators is their error increases rapidly with R and K, and thus
introduce large error unless the user has strong a priori knowledge of the mean and covariance.
Requiring users to provide such a priori bounds is a major challenge in deployed systems for
differentially private analysis (e.g. [GHK+16]). Our estimators have much better dependence on
these parameters, both asymptotically and concretely.
For our theoretical analysis and most of our evaluation, we derive bounds on the error of our
estimators assuming P is specifically the Gaussian N(µ,Σ). Although, as we show in some of
our experiments, our methods perform well even when we relax this assumption.
2For simplicy, we use the common convention that the size of the sample n is fixed.
3Formally, (ε, 0)-DP =⇒ 1
2
ε2-zCDP =⇒ (ε√2 log(1/δ) + 1
2
ε2, δ)-DP for every δ > 0
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1.3 Related Work
The most relevant line of work is that initiated by Karwa and Vadhan [KV18], which studies
private mean and variance estimation for Gaussian data, and focuses on important issues
for practice like dealing with weak a priori bounds on the parameters. Later works studied
the multivariate setting [KLSU19, CWZ19, KSSU19] and estimation under weaker moment
assumptions [BS19, KSU20], though these investigations are primarily theoretical. Our algorithm
for covariance estimation can be seen as a simpler and more practical variant of [KLSU19]. They
provide an iterative procedure which, based on a privatized finds the subspaces of high and low
variance they iteratively threshold eigenvalues to find directions of high and low variance, whereas
we employ a softer method to avoid wasting information. One noteworthy work is [DFM+20],
which provides practical private confidence intervals in the univariate setting. Instead, our
investigation is focused on realizable algorithms for the multivariate setting. Several works
consider private PCA or covariance estimation [DTTZ14, HP14, ADK+19], though, unlike our
work, these methods assume strong a priori bounds on the covariance.
A number of the early works in differential privacy give methods for differentially private
statistical estimation for i.i.d. data. The earliest works [DN03, DN04, BDMN05, DMNS06],
which introduced the Gaussian mechanism, among other foundational results, can be thought
of as methods for estimating the mean of a distribution over the hypercube {0, 1}d in the `∞
norm. Tight lower bounds for this problem follow from the tracing attacks introduced in [BUV14,
SU17a, DSS+15, BSU17, SU17b]. A very recent work of Acharya, Sun, and Zhang [ASZ20]
adapts classical tools for proving estimation and testing lower bounds (the lemmata of Assouad,
Fano, and Le Cam) to the private setting. Steinke and Ullman [SU17b] give tight minimax lower
bounds for the weaker guarantee of selecting the largest coordinates of the mean, which were
refined by Cai, Wang, and Zhang [CWZ19] to give lower bounds for sparse mean-estimation.
Other approaches for Gaussian estimation include [NRS07], which introduced the sample-
and-aggregate paradigm, and [BKSW19] which employs a private hypothesis selection method.
Zhang, Kamath, Kulkarni, and Wu privately estimate Markov Random Fields [ZKKW20], a
generalization of product distributions over the hypercube. Dwork and Lei [DL09] introduced
the propose-test-release framework for estimating robust statistics such as the median and
interquartile range. For further coverage of private statistics, see [KU20].
2 Preliminaries
We begin by recalling the definition of differential privacy, and the variant of concentrated
differential privacy that we use in this work.
Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy (DP) [DMNS06]). A randomized algorithm M : X n → Y
satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy ((ε, δ)-DP) if for every pair of neighboring datasets X,X ′ ∈ X n
(i.e., datasets that differ in exactly one entry),
∀Y ⊆ Y P[M(X) ∈ Y ] ≤ eε · P[M(X ′) ∈ Y ]+ δ.
When δ = 0, we say that M satisfies ε-differential privacy or pure differential privacy.
Definition 2.2 (Concentrated Differential Privacy (zCDP) [BS16]). A randomized algorithm
M : X n → Y satisfies ρ-zCDP if for every pair of neighboring datasets X,X ′ ∈ X n,
∀α ∈ (1,∞) Dα
(
M(X)||M(X ′)) ≤ ρα,
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where Dα(M(X)||M(X ′)) is the α-Re´nyi divergence between M(X) and M(X ′).4
Note that zCDP and DP are on different scales, but are otherwise can be ordered from most-to-
least restrictive. Specifically, (ε, 0)-DP implies ε
2
2 -zCDP, which implies roughly (ε
√
2 log(1/δ), δ)-
DP for every δ > 0 [BS16].
Both these definitions are closed under post-processing and can be composed with graceful
degradation of the privacy parameters.
Lemma 2.3 (Post Processing [DMNS06, BS16]). If M : X n → Y is (ε, δ)-DP, and P : Y → Z
is any randomized function, then the algorithm P ◦M is (ε, δ)-DP. Similarly if M is ρ-zCDP
then the algorithm P ◦M is ρ-zCDP.
Lemma 2.4 (Composition of CDP [DMNS06, DRV10, BS16]). If M is an adaptive composition
of differentially private algorithms M1, . . . ,MT , then
1. if M1, . . . ,MT are (ε1, δ1), . . . , (εT , δT )-DP then M is (
∑
t εt,
∑
t δt)-DP, and
2. if M1, . . . ,MT are ρ1, . . . , ρT -zCDP then M is (
∑
t ρt)-zCDP.
We can achieve differential privacy via noise addition proportional to sensitivity [DMNS06].
Definition 2.5 (Sensitivity). Let f : X n → Rd be a function, its `2-sensitivity is defined to be
∆f,2 = maxX∼X′∈Xn ‖f(X) − f(X ′)‖2, Here, X ∼ X ′ denotes that X and X ′ are neighboring
datasets (i.e., those that differ in exactly one entry).
For functions with bounded `1-sensitivity, we can achieve ε-DP by adding noise from a Laplace
distribution proportional to `1-sensitivity. For functions taking values in Rd for large d it is
more useful to add noise from a Gaussian distribution proportional to the `2-sensitivity, to get
(ε, δ)-DP and ρ-zCDP.
Lemma 2.6 (Gaussian Mechanism). Let f : X n → Rd be a function with `2-sensitivity ∆f,2.
Then the Gaussian mechanism
Mf (X) = f(X) +N
(
0,
(
∆f,2√
2ρ
)2
· Id×d
)
satisfies ρ-zCDP.
3 New Algorithms for Multivariate Gaussian Estimation
In this section, we present new algorithms for Gaussian parameter estimation. While these do
not result in improved asymptotic sample complexity bounds, they will lead to algorithms which
are much more practical in the multivariate setting. In particular, they will avoid the curse of
dimensionality incurred by multivariate histograms, but also eschew many of the hyperparameters
that arise in previous methods [KLSU19]. Note that our algorithms with t = 1 precisely describe
the na¨ıve method that was informally outlined in Section 1.2. We describe the algorithms and
sketch ideas behind the proofs, which appear in the appendix. Also in the appendix, we describe
simpler univariate algorithms in the same style. Understanding these algorithms and proofs first
might be helpful before approaching algorithms for the multivariate setting.
4Given two probability distributions P,Q over Ω, Dα(P‖Q) = 1α−1 log
(∑
x P (x)
αQ(x)1−α
)
.
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Algorithm 1 One Step Private Improvement of Mean Ball
Input: n samples X1...n from N(µ, Id×d), B2(c, r) containing µ, ρs, βs > 0
Output: A ρs-zCDP ball B2(c
′, r′)
1: procedure MVM(X1...n, c, r, ρs, βs)
2: Let γ1 =
√
d+ 2
√
d log(n/βs) + 2 log(n/βs).
3: Let γ2 =
√
d+ 2
√
d log(1/βs) + 2 log(1/βs). . γ1, γ2 ≈
√
d
4: Project each Xi into B2(c, r + γ1).
5: Let ∆ = 2(r + γ1)/n.
6: Compute Z = 1n
∑
iXi + Y , where
Y ∼ N
(
0,
(
∆√
2ρs
)2
· Id×d
)
.
7: Let c′ = Z, r′ = γ2
√
1
n +
2(r+γ1)2
n2ρs
.
8: return (c′, r′).
9: end procedure
Algorithm 2 Private Confidence-Ball-Based Multivariate Mean Estimation
Input: n samples X1...n from N(µ, Id×d), B2(c, r) containing µ, t ∈ N+, ρ1...t, β > 0
Output: A (
∑t
i=1 ρi)-zCDP estimate of µ
1: procedure MVMRec(X1...n, c, r, t, ρ1, . . . , ρt, β)
2: Let (c0, r0) = (c, r).
3: for i ∈ [t− 1] do
4: (ci, ri) = MVM(X1...n, ci−1, ri−1, ρi, β4(t−1)).
5: end for
6: (ct, rt) = MVM(X1...n, ct−1, rt−1, ρt, β4 ).
7: return ct.
8: end procedure
3.1 Multivariate Private Mean Estimation
We first present our multivariate private mean estimation algorithm MVMRec (Algorithm 2).
This is an iterative algorithm, which maintains a confidence ball that contains the true mean with
high probability. For ease of presentation, we state the algorithm for a Gaussian with identity
variance. However, by rescaling the data, the same argument works for an arbitrary known
covariance Σ. In fact, the covariance doesn’t even need to be known exactly – we just need a
proxy Σˆ such that C1I  Σˆ−1/2ΣΣˆ−1/2  C2I, where 0 < C1 < C2 are absolute constants.
MVMRec calls MVM t− 1 times, each time with a new `2-ball B2(ci, ri) centered at ci with
radius ri. We desire that each invocation is such that µ ∈ B2(ci, ri), and the ri’s should decrease
rapidly, so that we quickly converge to a fairly small ball which contains the mean. Our goal
will be to acquire a small enough radius. With this in hand, we can run the na¨ıve algorithm
which clips the data and applies the Gaussian mechanism. With large enough n, this will have
the desired accuracy.
It remains to reason about MVM. We need to argue (a) privacy and (b) accuracy: given
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B2(c, r) 3 µ, it is likely to output B2(c′, r′) 3 µ; and c) progress: the radius r′ output is much
smaller than the r input. The algorithm first chooses some γ and clips the data to B2(c, r+γ). γ
is chosen based on Gaussian tail bounds such that if µ ∈ B2(c, r), then none of the points will be
affected by this operation. This bounds the sensitivity of the empirical mean, and applying the
Gaussian mechanism guarantees privacy. While the noised mean will serve as a point estimate c′,
we actually have more: again using Gaussian tail bounds on the data combined with the added
noise, we can define a radius r′ such that µ ∈ B2(c′, r′), establishing accuracy. Finally, a large
enough n will ensure r′ < r/2, establishing progress. Since each step reduces our radius ri by
a constant factor, setting t = O(logR) will reduce the initial radius from R to O(1) as desired.
Formalizing this gives the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. MVMRec is (
∑t
i=1 ρi)-zCDP. Furthermore, suppose X1, . . . , Xn are samples
from N(µ, I) with µ contained in the ball B2(C,R), and n = Ω˜((
d
α2
+ dα√ρ +
√
d logR√
ρ ) · log 1β ).
Then MVMRec(X1, . . . , Xn, C,R, t = O(logR),
ρ
2(t−1) , . . . ,
ρ
2(t−1) ,
ρ
2 , β) will return µˆ such that
‖µ− µˆ‖Σ = ‖µ− µˆ‖2 ≤ α with probability at least 1− β.
3.2 Multivariate Private Covariance Estimation
We describe our multivariate private covariance estimation algorithm MVCRec (Algorithm 4).
The ideas are conceptually similar to mean estimation, but subtler due to the more complex
geometry. We assume data is drawn from N(0,Σ) where I  Σ  KI for some known K. One
can reduce to the zero-mean case by differencing pairs of samples. Further, if we know some
PSD matrix A such that A  Σ  KA then we can rescale the data by A−1/2.
To specify the algorithm we need a couple of tail bounds on the norm of points from a normal
distribution, the spectral-error of the empirical covariance, and the spectrum of a certain random
matrix. As these expressions are somewhat ugly, we define them outside of the pseudocode. In
these expressions, we fix parameters n, d, βs.
γ =
√
d+ 2
√
d log(n/βs) + 2 log(n/βs)
η = 2
(√
d
n
+
√
2 ln(βs/2)
n
)
+
(√
d
n
+
√
2 ln(βs/2)
n
)2
(1)
ν =
(
γ2
n
√
ρs
)(
2
√
d+ 2d1/6 log1/3 d+
6(1 + ((log d)/d)1/3)
√
log d√
log(1 + (log d/d)1/3)
+ 2
√
2 log(1/βs)
)
(2)
Similar to MVMRec, MVCRec repeatedly calls a private algorithm (MVC) that makes
a constant-factor progress, and then run the na¨ıve algorithm. Rather than maintaining a ball
containing the true mean, we maintain a pair of ellipsoids which sandwich the true covariance
between them (in fact, we rescale at each step so that the outer covariance is always the identity).5
Once the axes of these ellipsoids are within a constant factor we can apply the na¨ıve algorithm,
which is accurate given enough samples.
The algorithm MVC is similar to MVM. We first clip the points at a distance based on
Gaussian tail bounds with respect to the outer ellipsoid, which is unlikely to affect the dataset
when it dominates the true covariance. After this operation, we can show that the sensitivity
5The astute reader will notice that the algorithm itself never uses the lower bound on the covariance matrix.
However, it is useful to keep in mind for intuition, and will come up in the analysis.
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Algorithm 3 One Step Private Improvement of Covariance Ball
Input: n samples X1...n from N(0,Σ), matrices A,L such that L  AΣA  I, ρs, βs > 0
Output: A ρs-zCDP lower bound matrix L
′, symmetric matrix A′, noised covariance Z
1: procedure MVC(X1...n, A, L, ρs, βs)
2: Compute Wi = AXi. . Wi ∼ N(0, AΣA), L  AΣA  I
3: Let γ =
√
d+ 2
√
d log(n/βs) + 2 log(n/βs). . γ ≈
√
d
4: Project each Wi int B2(0, γ).
5: Let ∆ =
√
2γ2/n.
6: Compute Z = 1n
∑
iWiW
T
i +Y , where Y is the d×dmatrix with independentN(0,∆2/2ρ2s)
entries in the upper triangle and diagonal, and then made symmetric.
7: Let η, ν be as defined in (1) and (2), respectively. . η ≈
√
d
n and ν ≈ γ
2
√
d
n
√
ρs
8: Let U˜ = Z + ηI.
9: Let L′ = U˜−1/2(Z − ηI − νI)U˜−1/2 and A′ = U˜−1/2A.
10: return L′, A′, Z.
11: end procedure
Algorithm 4 Private Confidence-Ball-Based Multivariate Covariance Estimation
Input: n samples X1...n from N(0,Σ), L, u such that L  Σ  uI, t ∈ N+, ρ1...t, β > 0
Output: A (
∑t
i=1 ρi)-zCDP estimate of Σ
1: procedure MVCRec(X1...n, L, u, t, ρ1...t, β)
2: Let A0 =
1√
u
I, L0 =
1√
u
L.
3: for i ∈ [t− 1] do
4: (Ai, Li, Zi) = MVC(X1...n, Ai−1, Li−1, ρi, β4(t−1)).
5: end for
6: (At, Lt, Zt) = MVC(X1...n, At−1, Lt−1, ρt, β4 ).
7: return A−1t−1ZtA
−1
t−1.
8: end procedure
of an empirical covariance statistic is bounded using the following lemma. [KLSU19] proved a
similar statement without an explicit constant, but the optimal constant is important in practice.
Lemma 3.2. Let f(D) = 1n
∑
iDiD
T
i , where ‖Di‖22 ≤ T . Then the `2-sensitivity of f (i.e.,
maxD,D′ ‖f(D)− f(D′)‖F , where D and D′ are neighbors) is at most
√
2T
n .
Applying the Gaussian mechanism (a` la [DTTZ14]) in combination with this sensitivity
bound, we again get a private point estimate Z for the covariance, and can also derive inner and
outer confidence ellipsoids. This time we require more sophisticated tools, including confidence
intervals for the spectral norm of both a symmetric Gaussian matrix and the empirical covariance
matrix of Gaussian data. Using valid confidence intervals ensures accuracy, and a sufficiently
large n again results in a constant factor squeezing of the ellipsoids, guaranteeing progress.
Putting together the analysis leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3. MVCRec is (
∑t
i=1 ρi)-zCDP. Furthermore, suppose X1, . . . , Xn ∼ N(0,Σ),
where I  Σ  KI, and n = Ω˜(( d2
α2
+ d
2
α
√
ρ+
√
d3 logK√
ρ )·log 1β ). Then MVCRec(X1, . . . , Xn, I,K, t =
9
O(logK), ρ2(t−1) , . . . ,
ρ
2(t−1) ,
ρ
2 , β) will return Σˆ such that ‖Σˆ−1/2ΣΣˆ−1/2−I‖F ≤ α with probability
at least 1− β.
4 Experimental Evaluation
Before we proceed with our experimental evaluation, we recall the parameters which will be of
interest and varied throughout our experiments. We use n for the number of samples, d for the
dimension of the data, R for a bound on ‖µ‖2, and K for a bound such that I  Σ  KI. t is a
hyperparameter that represents the number of steps for our iterative algorithms; note that t = 1
corresponds to the na¨ıve algorithm mentioned in Section 1.2. Our comparisons will be for the
notion of ρ-zCDP, for various values of ρ. If we are running an algorithm that gives (ε, 0)-DP,
we convert the guarantees to ρ-zCDP for ρ = 12ε
2 to make a direct comparison. Code for our
algorithms and experiments is provided at https://github.com/twistedcubic/coin-press.
4.1 Mean Estimation Experiments
In this section, we present our experimental results on multivariate mean estimation. At a high
level, there are two general approaches for the multivariate problem. The first is to solve the
univariate problem in each dimension, and combine these results in the natural way. As shown
in [KLSU19], with an appropriate setting of parameters, an asymptotically optimal algorithm for
the univariate problem leads to an asymptotically near-optimal algorithm for the multivariate
problem. The other class of approaches is to work directly in the multivariate space, as done in
our novel method MVMRec (Figure 2). We compare the following approaches, labeled with
their names as in the legend of our plots:
1. The non-private empirical mean (Non-private);
2. Univariate na¨ıve method applied coordinatewise (Naive coordinatewise);
3. Karwa-Vadhan [KV18] applied coordinatewise (KV);
4. SYMQ of Du et al. [DFM+20] applied coordinatewise (SYMQ);
5. Multivariate na¨ıve method (i.e., Algorithm 2 with t = 1) (t = 1);
6. Algorithm 2 for various t > 1 (t = ♠, for integer ♠ > 1).
Implementation Details. We use our own implementation of these algorithms except for
SYMQ, for which we use the code that accompanies the paper [DFM+20]. There are a number
of small tuning details that affect performance in practice – we highlight these changes for our
method, and direct the curious reader to our accompanying code for more details. Our algorithm
has essentially four hyperparameters: choice of t, splitting the privacy budget, radius of the
clipping ball, and radius of the confidence ball. We explore the role of t in our experiments.
We found that assigning most of the privacy budet to the final iteration increased performance,
namely 3ρ/4 going to the final iteration and ρ/4(t− 1) to every other step. In theory, we use a
relatively large value for the clipping threshold because it is more convenient for the analysis.
In practice, we use a smaller clipping threshold to reduce sensitivity (partially driven by the
high-dimensional geometry), which we find improves practical performance.
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Experimental Setup. We describe our setup for all the following experiments (later high-
lighting any relevant deviations). We generate a dataset of n samples from a d-dimensional
Gaussian N(0, I), where we are promised the mean is bounded in `2-distance by R. We run all
the methods being compared to ensure a guarantee of ρ-CDP. We run each method 100 times,
and report the trimmed mean, with trimming parameter 0.1. We trim because a single failure
can significantly inflate the average error. Our plots display the `2-error of a method on the
y-axis. In some cases, we focus on the excess `2-error over the non-private baseline to provide a
clearer comparison of private methods. We did not focus on optimizing the running time, but
most of the plots (each involving about 1,000 runs of our algorithm) took only a few minutes to
generate on a laptop computer with an Intel Core i7-7700HQ CPU.
A Note on Hyperparameters. We note that in different experiments, the best variant of
our mechanism corresponded to different numbers of iterations, ranging from t = 2 to t = 10
iterations. However, we observe that in all experiments t = 10 performs competitively with
the best choice of t for that setting, showing that the method is relatively robust to how this
hyperparameter is tuned. Moreover, since the final error is ultimately determined by the value
of R used in the final call to the one-step estimator, and the sequence of value R follows a
deterministic recurrence, one could add a data-independent preprocessing step to evaluate the
recurrence for various values of t and determine the optimal choice. No other hyperparameters
tuning was used between different experiments.
4.1.1 Results and Discussion
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Figure 3: Baseline comparison of mean estimation algorithms (d = 50, R = 10
√
d, ρ = 0.5). Our
algorithm with t = 2 outperforms all other methods.
In our first experiment (Figure 3), we consider estimation in d = 50 dimensions with ρ = 0.5.
We set the initial radius to R = 10
√
d, which roughly means that the user can estimate the mean
of each coordinate a priori to within ±10 standard deviations. We then measure the error with
varying choices of sample size n between 103 and 104. The first and second panels show that our
method (with t = 2 iterations) significantly outperforms previous methods, and offers error that
is quite close to the non-private error. Concretely, we see that the additional cost of privacy is
about 27% for n = 1, 000 and decreases to just 2% for n = 10, 000.
In our next experiment (Figure 4), we consider the effect of increasing the initial radius
R, which corresponds to a user with less a priori knowledge of the parameters. Here, we fix
d = 50, n = 1, 000, ρ = 0.5 and vary R. We can see that when our method is run with t = 10
iterations, its error is essentially independent of R, showing no visible change in error, even when
we increase R by three orders of magnitude. In contrast, all other methods show dramatically
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Figure 4: Effect of increasing R (d = 50, n = 1000, ρ = 0.5). Even when SYMQ is advantaged
by giving it n = 2000 samples, our method with t = 10 outperforms it for large R.
worse performance as R grows. We note that, as predicted by theoretical analysis, the error of
SYMQ appears to observe a threshold behavior, in which the error grows proportionally to R
when n goes below this threshold and is nearly independent of R when n is above the threshold.
Thus, in the final panel, we “advantage” SYMQ by giving it twice as many samples (n = 2000
instead of n = 1000), and we observe that our method continues to have somewhat lower error.
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Figure 5: Low dimensional comparison (d = 2, R = 10
√
d, ρ = 0.5). Our method is superior
even in only 2 dimensions.
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Figure 6: High dimensional comparison (d = 500, R = 10
√
d, ρ = 0.5). Our method is effective
for all values of n.
In the next set of experiments (Figures 5 and 6) we consider both larger dimension (d = 500)
and smaller dimension (d = 2). In both cases we consider R = 10
√
d and ρ = 0.5 and very n. For
bivariate data (Figure 5), our method (with t = 2 iterations) still has the best performance, while
other methods have error comparable to the na¨ıve algorithm. For large dimension (Figure 6),
SYMQ is ineffetive at small sample sizes while our method (with t = 2) competes well with
non-private estimation—even with n < 4d samples, the cost of privacy is less than a factor of 2.
Next (Figure 7), we consider the effect of varying the privacy parameter ρ. We fix choices
of the other parameters (d = 50, n = 2000, R = 10
√
d). We observe that our methods remain
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Figure 7: Varying the privacy level (d = 50, n = 2000, R = 10
√
d). Our methods are effective
even at high privacy levels (small ρ).
superior for all choices of ρ, while coordinatewise methods are ineffective for high levels of privacy.
In particular, for these parameters, our the cost of privacy for our method remains smaller than
a factor of 2, even with privacy levels as low as ρ = 0.04, which roughly corresponds to ε = 0.25.
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Figure 8: Mean estimation with non-
Gaussian data (d = 50, R = 10
√
d, ρ =
0.5, t = 2). Our method is still effective
even under data with heavier tails.
Lastly (Figure 8), we give a proof-of-concept show-
ing that our methods do not strictly require Gaussian
data. We fix d = 50, R = 10
√
d, ρ = 0.5 and t = 2
iterations, and consider data drawn from various dis-
tributions with heavier tails: the multivariate Laplace
and the multivariate Student’s t-distribution with 3
degrees of freedom. We plot the excess error com-
pared to non-private estimation.6 Even with model
misspecifciation, our methods remain effective.
4.2 Covariance Estimation Experiments
We present our experimental results on multivariate
covariance estimation. Covariance estimation offers
fewer approaches to compare with, as it is unclear
how to apply a univariate algorithm to the multivari-
ate setting. In particular, estimating the off-diagonal
terms of the covariance matrix is a very different problem than estimating the variance of a
single normal, so an entrywise approach will run into significant challenges unless we assume the
covariance matrix is diagonal. Thus, we compare the following two approaches:
1. Na¨ıve method (MVCRec with t = 1)7;
2. Our method (MVCRec for various t > 1).
We do not compare with the algorithm of [KLSU19]. When implementing their algorithm, we
found it too difficult to tune the numerous intertwined hyperparameters well enough to produce
non-trivally accurate estimates. However, we note that our method can be seen as a “smoother”
variant of their approach that is easier to implement and tune.
6Note that, since we compare with non-private estimation on independent datasets, the excess error can
sometimes be negative due to randomness in the simulation, though it is always non-negative on average.
7This method, which amounts to clipping the data and then adding noise to the empirical covariance, is
sometimes called “Analyze Gauss,” due to its use in [DTTZ14].
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Implementation Details. As before, there are four hyperparameters: choice of t, splitting of
the privacy budget, radius of the clipping ball, and radius of the confidence ball. We find that
the same optimizations to the choice of t and the division of the privacy budget ρ are helpful
for covariance estimation. However, for covariance estimation we also find that an even more
aggressive shrinking of the confidence ellipsoids gives the best concrete performance.
4.2.1 Synthetic Data Experiments
Experimental Setup. We describe our setup for the following experiments, highlighting any
relevant deviations later. We generate a dataset of n samples from a d-dimensional Gaussian,
either N(0, I) (the isotropic case), or N(0,Σ), where Σ is a random rotation of a matrix with
d/2 eigenvalues equal to each of the values K and 1 (the skewed case). We run the methods
being compared to ensure a guarantee of ρ-CDP. As with mean estimation, we run 100 trials
of the algorithm and report the trimmed mean with trimming level 0.1. Our plots display
the Mahalanobis error of a method on the y-axis, or, equivalently, the Frobenius error after
accounting for differences in scaling in all directions. All experiments were completed within a
few minutes on a laptop computer with an Intel Core i7-7700HQ CPU.
Results and Discussion. In our first set of experiments (Figures 9 and 10) we consider
covariance estimation in d = 10 dimensions with ρ = 0.5. Note that a covariance matrix with
d = 10 dimensions has 55 non-redundant parameters, so this setting is somewhat analogous to
our experiments with mean estimation in d = 50 dimensions.
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Figure 9: Baseline comparison of covariance estimation algorithms (d = 10,K = 10
√
d, ρ = 0.5)
with isotropic covariance. Our algorithm significantly outpforms the na¨ıve baseline for all t > 1.
For the isotropic case (Figure 9) we can see that our method significantly outperforms the
na¨ıve baseline for all choices of t > 1, with t = 3 iterations giving the best results for these
parameters. For this setting of t = 3, the cost of privacy is within a factor of 1.5 for n = 3000.
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Figure 10: Baseline comparison of covariance estimation algorithms (d = 10,K = 10
√
d, ρ = 0.5)
with skewed covariance. For t = 2 our algorithm is competitive with the non-private ideal.
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For the skewed case (Figure 10) we see that with t = 2 our algorithm is significantly better
than the non-private baseline, although now accuracy degrades for larger choices of t.
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Figure 11: Effect of increasing K (d = 10, n = 7000, ρ = 0.5) with isotropic covariance (top)
and skewed covariance (bottom).
In our next set of experiments (Figure 11) we investigate the effect of the initial radius K,
fixing other parameters (d = 10, n = 7000, ρ = 0.5). We can see that for both the isotropic (top)
and skewed case (bottom) the t = 1 baseline is the least accurate of all alternatives. Our methods
perform significantly better for values of t = 3, 4, 5, although the optimal choice varies.
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Figure 12: Low dimensional comparison (d = 2,K = 10
√
d, ρ = 0.5) with isotropic covariance
(top) and skewed covariance (bottom).
Next we experiment with the low-dimensional case of bivariate data (Figure 12). We set
d = 2 and vary n while holding other parameters fixed (K = 10
√
d, ρ = 0.5). For the isotropic
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case (top) we see that all methods significantly outperform the na¨ıve baseline, and for the skewed
case (bottom) our method significantly outperforms the na¨ıve baseline for t = 2 iterations, but is
significantly more sensitive to the choice of t. As one would expect, since the dimension is small,
the cost of privacy is quite low for dataset sizes around n = 1000.
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Figure 13: High dimensional comparison (d = 100,K = 10
√
d, ρ = 0.5) with isotropic covariance.
t > 1 substantially outperform the t = 1 baseline, and t = 3 is competitive with the non-private
baseline up to a small constant factor for larger n.
Similarly, we perform a comparison for the high-dimensional case (Figure 13), setting d = 100,
corresponding to 5050 non-redundant parameters. We vary n and fix the other parameters
(K = 10
√
d, ρ = 0.5).
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Figure 14: Varying the privacy level (d = 10, n = 8000,K = 10
√
d) with isotropic covariance
(top) and skewed covariance (bottom).
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Finally, we investigate the role of the privacy budget ρ (Figure 14), fixing other parameters
(d = 10,K = 10
√
d, n = 8000). In the isotropic case (top) we see that larger t perform better,
particularly as ρ becomes very small. In the skewed case (bottom), we see that t = 2 is the most
accurate, while larger t seem to perform poorly at small privacy budgets.
A Note on Hyperparameters. As with our mean estimation, our covariance estimator has a
hyperparameter t specifying the number of iterations. Compared to mean estimation, the error
of the estimator appears to be much more sensitive to tuning this hyperparameter. Moreover,
we do not know how to predict the best choice of hyperparameter in a data-independent way.
Understanding how to set this hyperparameter privately, or modify the algorithm to make it less
sensitive to it, is an important direction for future study.
4.3 Map of Europe
Figure 15: Privately recovering Europe. Top:
color-coded map of Europe, middle-left: non-
private projection, middle-right: na¨ıve private
baseline (t = 1). Most structure is lost. Our
results (bottom, t = 3 and t = 5) are much more
effective at privately estimating the projection.
To demonstrate a practical use of our algo-
rithm, we investigate an application of our
method to private principal component anal-
ysis, a core technique used by data scientists
in exploratory data analysis. We revisit the
classic “genes mirror geography” discovery of
Novembre et al. [NJB+08]. In this work, the
authors investigated a multivariate dataset col-
lected as part of the Population Reference Sam-
ple (POPRES) project. This dataset contained
the genetic data of over 1387 European indi-
viduals, annotated by their country of origin.
They authors projected this dataset onto its
top two principal components to produce a
two-dimensional representation of the genetic
variation, which bears a strong resemblance
to the map of Europe. However, a significant
pitfall is that the given dataset is highly sensi-
tive in nature, consisting of individuals’ genetic
data. As such, it would be advantageous if we
could extract the same insights from the data,
even under the constraint of differential pri-
vacy. To this end, we investigate the efficacy
of our method in comparison to the baseline
private method.
Though the original dataset is very high
dimensional, we obtained a 20-dimensional ver-
sion of the dataset (n = 1387) from the authors’ GitHub.8 We randomly rotate the data to
ensure that any structure in their representation is lost. Recall that the analyst must have some
prior knowledge about the covariance: in our algorithm’s phrasing, they must select a parameter
K and a transformation of the data which places the true covariance between I and KI. We
simulate an analyst who has minimal information about the data, scaling up the data by a factor
8https://github.com/NovembreLab/Novembre_etal_2008_misc
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of 20 and setting K = 30 – the true top two eigenvalues afterwards are roughly 4.8 and 1.2, so
the loose upper bound on K signifies that there is significant uncertainty on the scale of the data.
An analyst with even less information could pick a larger scaling factor and K.
Our results are presented in Figure 15. The first subplot shows the results of the experiment
using the non-private empirical covariance. The second subplot is the private projection of the
dataset using the na¨ıve method (t = 1). We can see that most of the structure is lost – the inner
product of the top two private principal components with the true ones are 0.48 and 0.28. The
third subplot is the private projection of the dataset when we use our method with t = 3. This
bears a stronger resemblance to the original image – the same dot products are now 0.98 and
0.48. As the top principal component is much larger in magnitude than the second one, it is
easier to accurately recover. Finally, the fourth subplot is the private projection of our method
with t = 5. This bears the strongest resemblance to the original image, with dot products of
0.96 and 0.92. Thus, our method demonstrates promise for improving performance of private
exploratory data analysis.
5 Conclusions
We provided the first effective and realizable algorithms for differentially private estimation
of mean and covariance in the multivariate setting. We demonstrated that not only do these
algorithms have strong theoretical guarantees (matching the state-of-the-art), but they are also
accurate even at relatively low sample sizes and high dimensions. They significantly outperform
all prior methods, possess few hyperparameters, and remain precise even when given minimal
prior information about the data. In addition, we showed that our methods can be used for a
private version of PCA, a task which is common in data science and exploratory data analysis.
As we are seeing the rise of a number of new libraries for practical differentially private statistics
and data analysis [The20, ABW20] we believe our results add an important tool to the toolkit
for the multivariate setting.
Acknowledgments
GK thanks Aleksandar Nikolov for useful discussions about the proof of Lemma 3.2.
References
[ABW20] Joshua Allen, Sarah Bird, and Kathleen Walker. Whitenoise: A platform for
differential privacy, May 2020.
[ADK+19] Kareem Amin, Travis Dick, Alex Kulesza, Andres Munoz, and Sergei Vassilvitskii.
Differentially private covariance estimation. In Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems 32, NeurIPS ’19, pages 14190–14199. Curran Associates, Inc.,
2019.
[ASZ20] Jayadev Acharya, Ziteng Sun, and Huanyu Zhang. Differentially private assouad,
fano, and le cam. arXiv preprint arXiv:2004.06830, 2020.
[BDMN05] Avrim Blum, Cynthia Dwork, Frank McSherry, and Kobbi Nissim. Practical privacy:
The SuLQ framework. In Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART
18
Symposium on Principles of Database Systems, PODS ’05, pages 128–138, New York,
NY, USA, 2005. ACM.
[BDRS18] Mark Bun, Cynthia Dwork, Guy N. Rothblum, and Thomas Steinke. Composable
and versatile privacy via truncated cdp. In Proceedings of the 50th Annual ACM
Symposium on the Theory of Computing, STOC ’18, pages 74–86, New York, NY,
USA, 2018. ACM.
[BEM+17] Andrea Bittau, U´lfar Erlingsson, Petros Maniatis, Ilya Mironov, Ananth Raghu-
nathan, David Lie, Mitch Rudominer, Ushasree Kode, Julien Tinnes, and Bernhard
Seefeld. Prochlo: Strong privacy for analytics in the crowd. In Proceedings of the
26th ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, SOSP ’17, pages 441–459,
New York, NY, USA, 2017. ACM.
[BKSW19] Mark Bun, Gautam Kamath, Thomas Steinke, and Zhiwei Steven Wu. Private
hypothesis selection. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 32,
NeurIPS ’19, pages 156–167. Curran Associates, Inc., 2019.
[BS16] Mark Bun and Thomas Steinke. Concentrated differential privacy: Simplifications,
extensions, and lower bounds. In Proceedings of the 14th Conference on Theory of
Cryptography, TCC ’16-B, pages 635–658, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2016. Springer.
[BS19] Mark Bun and Thomas Steinke. Average-case averages: Private algorithms for smooth
sensitivity and mean estimation. In Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems 32, NeurIPS ’19, pages 181–191. Curran Associates, Inc., 2019.
[BSU17] Mark Bun, Thomas Steinke, and Jonathan Ullman. Make up your mind: The price of
online queries in differential privacy. In Proceedings of the 28th Annual ACM-SIAM
Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA ’17, pages 1306–1325, Philadelphia, PA,
USA, 2017. SIAM.
[BUV14] Mark Bun, Jonathan Ullman, and Salil Vadhan. Fingerprinting codes and the price of
approximate differential privacy. In Proceedings of the 46th Annual ACM Symposium
on the Theory of Computing, STOC ’14, pages 1–10, New York, NY, USA, 2014.
ACM.
[BVH16] Afonso S. Bandeira and Ramon Van Handel. Sharp nonasymptotic bounds on the
norm of random matrices with independent entries. The Annals of Probability,
44(4):2479–2506, 2016.
[CWZ19] T. Tony Cai, Yichen Wang, and Linjun Zhang. The cost of privacy: Optimal rates
of convergence for parameter estimation with differential privacy. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1902.04495, 2019.
[DFM+20] Wenxin Du, Canyon Foot, Monica Moniot, Andrew Bray, and Adam Groce. Differ-
entially private confidence intervals. arXiv preprint arXiv:2001.02285, 2020.
[Dif17] Differential Privacy Team, Apple. Learning with privacy at scale. https:
//machinelearning.apple.com/docs/learning-with-privacy-at-scale/
appledifferentialprivacysystem.pdf, December 2017.
19
[DKY17] Bolin Ding, Janardhan Kulkarni, and Sergey Yekhanin. Collecting telemetry data
privately. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 30, NIPS ’17, pages
3571–3580. Curran Associates, Inc., 2017.
[DL09] Cynthia Dwork and Jing Lei. Differential privacy and robust statistics. In Proceedings
of the 41st Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, STOC ’09, pages
371–380, New York, NY, USA, 2009. ACM.
[DLS+17] Aref N. Dajani, Amy D. Lauger, Phyllis E. Singer, Daniel Kifer, Jerome P. Reiter,
Ashwin Machanavajjhala, Simson L. Garfinkel, Scot A. Dahl, Matthew Graham,
Vishesh Karwa, Hang Kim, Philip Lelerc, Ian M. Schmutte, William N. Sexton, Lars
Vilhuber, and John M. Abowd. The modernization of statistical disclosure limitation
at the U.S. census bureau, 2017. Presented at the September 2017 meeting of the
Census Scientific Advisory Committee.
[DMNS06] Cynthia Dwork, Frank McSherry, Kobbi Nissim, and Adam Smith. Calibrating
noise to sensitivity in private data analysis. In Proceedings of the 3rd Conference on
Theory of Cryptography, TCC ’06, pages 265–284, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2006. Springer.
[DN03] Irit Dinur and Kobbi Nissim. Revealing information while preserving privacy. In
Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART Symposium on Principles
of Database Systems, PODS ’03, pages 202–210, New York, NY, USA, 2003. ACM.
[DN04] Cynthia Dwork and Kobbi Nissim. Privacy-preserving datamining on vertically
partitioned databases. In Proceedings of the 24th Annual International Cryptology
Conference, CRYPTO ’04, pages 528–544, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2004. Springer.
[DR16] Cynthia Dwork and Guy N. Rothblum. Concentrated differential privacy. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1603.01887, 2016.
[DRV10] Cynthia Dwork, Guy N. Rothblum, and Salil Vadhan. Boosting and differential
privacy. In Proceedings of the 51st Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science, FOCS ’10, pages 51–60, Washington, DC, USA, 2010. IEEE
Computer Society.
[DSS+15] Cynthia Dwork, Adam Smith, Thomas Steinke, Jonathan Ullman, and Salil Vad-
han. Robust traceability from trace amounts. In Proceedings of the 56th Annual
IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS ’15, pages 650–669,
Washington, DC, USA, 2015. IEEE Computer Society.
[DSSU17] Cynthia Dwork, Adam Smith, Thomas Steinke, and Jonathan Ullman. Exposed! a
survey of attacks on private data. Annual Review of Statistics and Its Application,
4(1):61–84, 2017.
[DTTZ14] Cynthia Dwork, Kunal Talwar, Abhradeep Thakurta, and Li Zhang. Analyze Gauss:
Optimal bounds for privacy-preserving principal component analysis. In Proceedings
of the 46th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, STOC ’14, pages
11–20, New York, NY, USA, 2014. ACM.
20
[EPK14] U´lfar Erlingsson, Vasyl Pihur, and Aleksandra Korolova. RAPPOR: Randomized
aggregatable privacy-preserving ordinal response. In Proceedings of the 2014 ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS ’14, pages 1054–1067,
New York, NY, USA, 2014. ACM.
[GHK+16] Marco Gaboardi, James Honaker, Gary King, Jack Murtagh, Kobbi Nissim, Jonathan
Ullman, and Salil Vadhan. Psi (ψ): A private data sharing interface. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1609.04340, 2016.
[HP14] Moritz Hardt and Eric Price. The noisy power method: A meta algorithm with
applications. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 27, NIPS ’14,
pages 2861–2869. Curran Associates, Inc., 2014.
[HSR+08] Nils Homer, Szabolcs Szelinger, Margot Redman, David Duggan, Waibhav Tembe,
Jill Muehling, John V. Pearson, Dietrich A. Stephan, Stanley F. Nelson, and David W.
Craig. Resolving individuals contributing trace amounts of DNA to highly complex
mixtures using high-density SNP genotyping microarrays. PLoS Genetics, 4(8):1–9,
2008.
[KLSU19] Gautam Kamath, Jerry Li, Vikrant Singhal, and Jonathan Ullman. Privately learning
high-dimensional distributions. In Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference on
Learning Theory, COLT ’19, pages 1853–1902, 2019.
[KSSU19] Gautam Kamath, Or Sheffet, Vikrant Singhal, and Jonathan Ullman. Differentially
private algorithms for learning mixtures of separated Gaussians. In Advances in
Neural Information Processing Systems 32, NeurIPS ’19, pages 168–180. Curran
Associates, Inc., 2019.
[KSU20] Gautam Kamath, Vikrant Singhal, and Jonathan Ullman. Private mean estimation
of heavy-tailed distributions. arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.09464, 2020.
[KU20] Gautam Kamath and Jonathan Ullman. A primer on private statistics. arXiv
preprint arXiv:2005.00010, 2020.
[KV18] Vishesh Karwa and Salil Vadhan. Finite sample differentially private confidence in-
tervals. In Proceedings of the 9th Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer
Science, ITCS ’18, pages 44:1–44:9, Dagstuhl, Germany, 2018. Schloss Dagstuhl–
Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik.
[LM00] Beatrice Laurent and Pascal Massart. Adaptive estimation of a quadratic functional
by model selection. The Annals of Statistics, 28(5):1302–1338, 2000.
[Mir17] Ilya Mironov. Re´nyi differential privacy. In Proceedings of the 30th IEEE Computer
Security Foundations Symposium, CSF ’17, pages 263–275, Washington, DC, USA,
2017. IEEE Computer Society.
[NJB+08] John Novembre, Toby Johnson, Katarzyna Bryc, Zolta´n Kutalik, Adam R. Boyko,
Adam Auton, Amit Indap, Karen S. King, Sven Bergmann, Matthew R. Nelson,
Matthew Stephens, and Carlos D. Bustamante. Genes mirror geography within
Europe. Nature, 456(7218):98–101, 2008.
21
[NRS07] Kobbi Nissim, Sofya Raskhodnikova, and Adam Smith. Smooth sensitivity and
sampling in private data analysis. In Proceedings of the 39th Annual ACM Symposium
on the Theory of Computing, STOC ’07, pages 75–84, New York, NY, USA, 2007.
ACM.
[SU17a] Thomas Steinke and Jonathan Ullman. Between pure and approximate differential
privacy. The Journal of Privacy and Confidentiality, 7(2):3–22, 2017.
[SU17b] Thomas Steinke and Jonathan Ullman. Tight lower bounds for differentially private
selection. In Proceedings of the 58th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science, FOCS ’17, pages 552–563, Washington, DC, USA, 2017. IEEE
Computer Society.
[The20] The OpenDP Team. The opendp white paper. https://projects.iq.harvard.
edu/files/opendp/files/opendp_white_paper_11may2020.pdf, May 2020.
[Ver12] Roman Vershynin. Introduction to the non-asymptotic analysis of random matrices.
In Yonina C. Eldar and Gitta Kutyniok, editors, Compressed Sensing, pages 210–268.
Cambridge University Press, 2012.
[Wai19] Martin J. Wainwright. High-Dimensional Statistics: A Non-Asymptotic Viewpoint.
Cambridge University Press, 2019.
[ZKKW20] Huanyu Zhang, Gautam Kamath, Janardhan Kulkarni, and Zhiwei Steven Wu.
Privately learning Markov random fields. arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.09463, 2020.
A New Algorithms for Univariate Gaussian Parameter Estima-
tion
In this section, we present our algorithms for estimating the mean and variance of a univariate
Gaussian. We will write all our algorithms to give zCDP privacy guarantees, but the same
approach can give pure DP algorithms in the univariate setting. One must simply switch Gaussian
to Laplace noise, swap in the appropriate tail bounds for the confidence interval, and apply basic
composition rather than zCDP composition.
A.1 Univariate Private Mean Estimation
We start with our univariate private mean estimation algorithm UVMRec (Algorithm 6). The
guarantees are presented in Theorem A.1, note that the sample complexity is optimal in all
parameters up to logarithmic factors [KV18]. While our algorithm and results are stated for a
Gaussian with known variance, the same guarantees hold if the algorithm is only given the true
variance up to a constant factor. Algorithm 6 is an iterative invocation of Algorithm 5, each
step of which makes progress by shrinking our confidence interval for where the true mean lies.
This is the simplest instantiation of our general algorithmic formula. Additionally, our proof
of correctness is spelled out in full detail for this case – as the other proofs follow an almost
identical structure, we only describe the differences.
Theorem A.1. UVMRec is (
∑t
i=1 ρi)-zCDP. Furthermore, suppose we are given samples
X1, . . . , Xn from N(µ, σ
2), where |µ| < Rσ and n = Ω˜
((
1
α2
+ 1α√ρ +
√
logR√
ρ
)
· log(1/β)
)
. Then
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Algorithm 5 One Step Private Improvement of Mean Interval
Input: n samples X1...n from N(µ, σ
2), [`, r] containing µ, σ2, ρs, βs > 0
Output: A ρs-zCDP interval [`
′, r′]
1: procedure UVM(X1...n, `, r, σ
2, ρs, βs)
2: Project each Xi into the interval [`− σ
√
2 log(2n/βs), r + σ
√
2 log(2n/βs)].
3: Let ∆ =
r−`+2σ
√
2 log(2n/βs)
n .
4: Compute Z = 1n
∑
iXi + Y , where Y ∼ N
(
0,
(
∆√
2ρs
)2)
.
5: return the interval Z ±
√
2
(
σ2
n +
(
∆√
2ρs
)2)
log(2/βs).
6: end procedure
Algorithm 6 Private Confidence-interval-based Univariate Mean Estimation
Input: n samples X1...n from N(µ, σ
2), [`, r] containing µ, σ2, t ∈ N+, ρ1...t, β > 0
Output: A (
∑t
i=1 ρi)-zCDP estimate of µ
1: procedure UVMRec(X1...n, `, r, σ
2, t, ρ1...t, β)
2: Let `0 = `, r0 = r.
3: for i ∈ [t− 1] do
4: [`i, ri] = UVM(X1...n, `i−1, ri−1, σ2, ρi, β/4(t− 1)).
5: end for
6: [`t, rt] = UVM(X1...n, `t−1, rt−1, σ2, ρt, β/4).
7: return the midpoint of [`i, ri].
8: end procedure
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UVMRec(X1, . . . , Xn,−R,R, σ2, t = O(logR), ρ/2(t − 1), . . . , ρ/2(t − 1), ρ/2, β) will return µˆ
such that |µ− µˆ| ≤ ασ with probability at least 1− β.
Proof. We start by proving privacy. Observe that by application of the Gaussian mechanism
(Lemma 2.6) in Line 4 of Algorithm 5, this algorithm is ρ-zCDP. Privacy of Algorithm 6 follows
by composition of zCDP (Lemma 2.4).
We start by analyzing the t − 1 iterations of the Line 3, each of which calls Algorithm 5.
We prove two properties of this algorithm. Informally, it will always create a valid confidence
interval, and the confidence interval shrinks by a constant factor. More formally:
1. First, if Algorithm 5 is invoked with µ ∈ [`, r], then it returns an interval [`′, r′] 3 µ,
with probability at least 1 − 2βs. To show this, we begin by considering a variant of the
algorithm where Line 2 is omitted. In this case, observe that Z is a Gaussian with mean
µ and variance σ
2
n +
(
∆√
2ρs
)2
. Then µ ∈ [`′, r′] with probability 1 − βs by Fact C.1. Re-
introducing Line 2, Fact C.1 and a union bound imply that the total variation distance
between the true process and the one without Line 2 is at most βs, and thus µ ∈ [`′, r′]
with probability at least 1− 2βs.
2. Second, if r − ` > Cσ for some absolute constant C, then r′ − `′ ≤ 12(r − `). The width
of the interval r′ − `′ = 2
√
2
(
σ2
n +
(
∆√
2ρs
)2)
log(2/βs) ≤ 2
√
2 log(2/βs)
(
σ√
n
+ ∆√
2ρs
)
.
The former term can be bounded as O(1) · σ, using the facts that βs = β/4(t − 1),
t = O(logR), and n = Ω(log(logR/β)). We rewrite and bound the latter term as
O
(√
logR
√
log(n logR/β)(r−`+σ)
n
√
ρ
)
, and the claim follows based on our condition on n.
We turn to the final call, in Line 6. The idea will be that the interval [`t−1, rt−1] will now be so
narrow (after the previous shrinking) that the noise addition in Algorithm 5 will be insignificant.
Invoking the two points above respectively, we have that: (1) µ ∈ [`t−1, rt−1] with probability
at least 1 − β/2 (where we used a union bound), and (2) |rt−1 − `t−1| ≤ O(1) · σ (where we
also used t = O(logR)). Conditioning on these, we show that |Z − µ| ≤ ασ. Similar to before,
we consider a variant of Algorithm 5 where Line 2 is omitted, and by Gaussian tail bounds,
|Z−µ| ≤ O
√√√√(σ2
n +
(
σ
√
log(n/β)
n
√
ρ
)2)
log(1/β)
 with probability at least 1−β/4. Our choice
of n bounds this expression by ασ. Observing that (similar to before) Line 2 only rounds any
point with probability at most β/4, the estimate is accurate with probability at least 1 − β/2.
Combining with the previous β/2 probability of failure completes the proof.
A.2 Univariate Private Variance Estimation
We proceed to present our our univariate private variance estimation algorithm UVVRec
(Algorithm 8). The guarantees are presented in Theorem A.2. Note that our algorithms work
given an arbitrary interval [`, u] containing σ2, but for simplicity, we normalize so that ` = 1 and
then u = K. The first two terms in the sample complexity are optimal up to logarithmic factors,
though using different methods, the third term’s dependence on K can be reduced from
√
logK to√
log logK [KV18]. As our primary focus in this paper is on providing simple algorithms requiring
minimal hyperparameter tuning, we do not attempt to explore optimizations for this term. Our
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algorithm will take as input samples Xi ∼ N(0, σ2) from a zero-mean Gaussian. One can easily
reduce to this case from the general case: given Yi ∼ N(µ, σ2), then 1√2(Y2i−1 − Y2i) ∼ N(0, σ2).
Algorithm 7 One Step Private Improvement of Variance Interval
Input: n samples X1, . . . , Xn from N(0, σ
2), [`, u] containing σ2, ρs, βs > 0
Output: A ρs-zCDP interval [`
′, u′]
1: procedure UVV(X1...n, `, u, ρs, βs)
2: Compute Wi = X
2
i . . Wi ∼ σ2χ21
3: Project each Wi into [0, u · (1 + 2
√
log(1/βs) + 2 log(1/βs))].
4: Let ∆ = 1n · u · (1 + 2
√
log(1/βs) + 2 log(1/βs)).
5: Compute Z = 1n
∑
iWi + Y , where Y ∼ N
(
0,
(
∆√
2ρs
)2)
.
6: return the intersection of [`, u] with the interval
Z + 2u ·
[
− ∆√
ρs
√
log(4/β2)−
√
log(4/β2)
n
− log(4/β2)
n
,
∆√
ρs
√
log(4/β2) +
√
log(4/β2)
n
]
.
7: end procedure
Algorithm 8 Private Confidence-Interval-Based Univariate Variance Estimation
Input: n samples X1...n from N(0, σ
2), [`, u] containing σ2, t ∈ N+, ρ1...t, β > 0
Output: A (
∑t
i=1 ρi)-zCDP estimate of σ
2
1: procedure UVVRec(X1...n, `, u, t, ρ1...t, β)
2: Let `0 = `, u0 = u.
3: for i ∈ [t− 1] do
4: [`i, ui] = UVV(X1...n, `i−1, ui−1, ρi, β/4(t− 1)).
5: end for
6: [`t, ut] = UVV(X1...n, `t−1, ut−1, ρt, β/4).
7: return the midpoint of [`i, ui].
8: end procedure
Theorem A.2. UVVRec is (
∑t
i=1 ρi)-zCDP. Furthermore, suppose we are given i.i.d. samples
X1, . . . , Xn from N(0, σ
2), where 1 ≤ σ2 < K and n = Ω˜
((
1
α2
+ 1α√ρ +
√
logK√
ρ
)
· log(1/β)
)
.
Then UVVRec(X1, . . . , Xn, 1,K, t = O(logK), ρ/2(t− 1), . . . , ρ/2(t− 1), ρ/2, β) will return σˆ2
such that |σˆ2/σ2 − 1| ≤ α with probability at least 1− β.
Proof. Overall, the proof is very similar to that of Theorem A.1, so we only highlight the
differences. First, we note that the proof of privacy is identical, via the Gaussian mechanism
and composition of zCDP.
We again analyze each of the calls in the loop, which this time call Algorithm 7. First, if
Algorithm 7 is invoked with σ2 ∈ [`, u], then it returns an interval containing σ2 with probability
at least 1− 2βs. We use the same argument as before: in Line 3, we observe that the Wi’s are
scaled chi-squared random variables with 1 degree of freedom and apply Fact C.2. In Line 6,
our confidence interval is generated using a combination of Facts C.1 and C.2. Note that, since
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the true variance is unknown, we conservatively scale by the upper bound on the variance u, to
guarantee that the confidence interval is valid.
Second, we argue that we make “progress” each step. Specifically, we claim that if u/` ≥ C
for some absolute constant C  1, then we return an interval of width ≤ 12(u−`). The condition
implies that the width of the interval starts at u− ` ≥ u(1− 1/C). Substituting our condition
on n into the width of the confidence interval, we can upper bound its width by C ′u, where
0 < C ′  1 is a constant that can be taken arbitrarily close to 0 based on the hidden constant
in the condition on n. Combining these two facts yields the claim.
Now, similar to before, we inspect the final call to UVV in Line 6 of UVVRec. Again, due
to the second claim above and the fact that we chose t = log2K, this will be called with ` and u
such that ut−1/`t−1 ≤ C. The first claim above implies that `t−1 ≤ σ2 ≤ rt−1 with probability
at least 1 − β/2 (which we condition on). As argued above, the confidence interval defined in
Line 6 contains σ2 with probability at least 1−β/2. Using the theorem’s condition on n (with a
sufficiently large hidden constant), we have that its width is at most αu/C ≤ α` ≤ ασ2, which
implies the desired conclusion.
B Missing Proofs from Section 3
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
The proof is very similar to that of Theorem A.1, so we assume familiarity with that and only
highlight the differences. First, we note that the proof of privacy is identical, via the Gaussian
mechanism and composition of zCDP.
We again analyze each of the calls in the loop, which this time refer to Algorithm 1. First, if
Algorithm 1 is invoked with µ ∈ B2(c, r), then it returns a ball B2(c′, r′) 3 µ with probability at
least 1 − β1 − β2. The argument is identical to before, but this time using a tail bound for a
multivariate Gaussian (Fact C.2) instead of the univariate version. Second, if r > C
√
d for some
constant C > 0, then r′ < r/2. Once again, this can reasoned by inspecting the expression for r′
and applying our condition on n (in particular, focusing on the term which is Ω˜
(√
d logR√
ρ
)
).
Finally, we inspect the last call in Line 6. Similar to before, the radius of the ball rt−1 ≤ C
√
d.
In this final call, we can again couple the process with the one which doesn’t round the points to
the ball (which we will focus on), where the probability that the two processes differ is at most
β/4. By Fact C.2, we have that ‖Z − µ‖2 ≤ O˜
(√(
1
n +
d
n2ρ
)√
d+
√
d log(1/β2) + log(1/β2)
)
with probability at least 1 − β/4. Substituting in our condition on n and accounting for the
failure probability at any previous step completes the proof.
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B.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Suppose the datasets differ in that one contains a point X which is replaced by the point Y in
the other dataset.∥∥∥∥ 1n(XXT − Y Y T )
∥∥∥∥
F
=
1
n
√
Tr((XXT − Y Y T )2)
=
1
n
√
Tr((XXT )2 −XXTY Y T − Y Y TXXT + (Y Y T )2)
≤ 1
n
√
‖XXT ‖2F + ‖Y Y T ‖2F
=
1
n
√
‖X‖42 + ‖Y ‖42
≤ 1
n
√
2T 2
=
√
2
n
T
The first inequality is since Tr(AB) ≥ 0, for any positive semi-definite matrices A and B.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 3.3
Privacy again follows from the Gaussian mechanism and composition of zCDP. Note that this
time, the sensitivity bound is not obvious – the analysis depends on Lemma 3.2.
Next, we analyze each of the calls in the loop, referring to Algorithm 3. If Algorithm 3 is
invoked with L  AΣA  I, then it returns A′, L′ such that L′  A′ΣA′  I with probability at
least 1− β1 − β2. The analysis is similar to before: we bound the probability that a point gets
adjusted in Line 3 using Fact C.2. We bound the spectral norm of the error due to sampling and the
Gaussian noise matrix using Lemma C.3 and C.4, respectively. The claim follows from elementary
linear algebra: the above spectral norm bounds imply that Z − (η + ν)I  AΣA  Z + ηI, and
scaling by (Z + ηI)−1/2 gives the result.
We now argue that we make progress each step. For all unit vectors v, if vTLv ≤ C for some
absolute constant 0 < C < 1/2, then vT U˜v− vT (Z − (η+ ν)I)v ≤ 12(1− vTLv). To motivate the
conclusion of this claim: we note that the two matrices U˜ and (Z−(η+ν)I) are the matrices I and
L′ scaled by U˜1/2 – thus, we will argue that, in any direction, the width of the window bounding
vTAΣAv shrinks by a factor of at least 2. Returning to the proof: the condition vTLv ≤ C
implies that that 1− vTLv ≥ 1− C. We note that vT (Z + ηI)v − vT (Z − (η + ν)I)v = 2η + ν.
Substituting our condition on n will upper bound 2η + ν ≤ C ′, for some absolute constant
C ′  12(1− C) ≤ 12(1− vTLv), as desired.
Now, similar to before, we inspect the final call in Line 6. The second claim above, unrolling
the effect of the scaling matrices A, and the fact that we chose t = O(logK) implies that
vTLt−1v ≥ C. The first claim above implies that Lt−1  At−1ΣAt−1  I with probability at
least 1− β/2 (which we condition on). With these in place, analysis follows similarly to Lemma
3.6 of [KLSU19]. Sketching the argument: our condition on n implies that the Frobenius norm
of both the empirical covariance and the noise added will be bounded by α. Rescaling Z by the
scaling matrix At−1 gives the desired result.
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C Concentration Inequalities and Tail Bounds
The following tail bounds are standard.
Fact C.1. If X ∼ N(µ, σ2), then Pr(|X − µ| ≥ σ√2 log(2/β)) ≤ β.
Fact C.2 (Lemma 1 of [LM00]). If X is a chi-squared random variable with k degrees of freedom,
then Pr(X − k ≥ 2√k log(1/β) + 2 log(1/β)) ≤ β and Pr(k −X ≥ 2√k log(1/β)) ≤ β. Thus, if
Y ∼ N(0, I), then Pr(‖Y ‖22 ≥ d+ 2
√
d log(1/β) + 2 log(1/β)) ≤ β.
We also need the following bound on the spectral error of an empirical covariance matrix.
Lemma C.3 ((6.12) of [Wai19]). Suppose we are given X1, . . . , Xn ∼ N(0,Σ) ∈ Rd, and let
Σˆ = 1n
∑n
i=1XiX
T
i . Then
‖Σˆ− Σ‖2 ≤ ‖Σ‖2
2(√d
n
+
√
2 ln(β/2)
n
)
+
(√
d
n
+
√
2 ln(β/2)
n
)2
with probability at least 1− β.
Finally, we need a bounds on the spectral norm of a symmetric matrix with random Gaussian
entries.
Lemma C.4. Let Y be the d× d matrix where Yij N(0, σ2) for i ≤ j, and Yij = Yji for i > j.
Then with probability at least 1− β, we have the following bound:
‖Y ‖2 ≤ σ
(
2
√
d+ 2d1/6 log1/3 d+
6(1 + (log d/d)1/3)
√
log d√
log(1 + (log d/d)1/3)
+ 2
√
2 log(1/β)
)
Proof. First, we have the following bound on the expectation of the spectral norm:
E‖Y ‖2 ≤ σ
(
2
√
d+ 2d1/6 log1/3 d+
6(1 + (log d/d)1/3)
√
log d√
log(1 + (log d/d)1/3)
)
.
This is from Theorem 1.1 of [BVH16], fixing the value of ε = log dd . The desired tail bound fol-
lows since the spectral norm is 2-Lipschitz for this class of symmetric matrices, and by Gaussian
concentration of Lipschitz functions (e.g., Proposition 5.34 of [Ver12]).
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